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Abstract
This paper considers some methodological issues central to the study of gender. Methods
carry their own ontologies. The sorts of mathematical modelling methods employed by main-
stream modellers force their users to consider worlds of isolated atoms and closed systems.
However, a resolution of some of the problems involved with the conceptualisation of gender
strongly suggests methods appropriate for addressing phenomena generated in open systems
are required. And I contend that unless social theorists, including economists, supplement the
existing array of analytical methods with those that, like contrast explanation, are somewhat
more dialectical in nature, the study of gender is unlikely to progress very far or with much
speed.
Some problems of gender
What sorts of methodological issues are pertinent to the study of gender?   The answer in part
depends on what precisely we take gender to be.  In truth it is a category that is somewhat
contested, with some theorists disputing its analytical usefulness entirely. Certainly numerous
problems have been raised regarding its study. Before, then, I can turn to relevant questions of
methodology, I must settle on a conception of gender that is coherent. The task of determining
such a conception is addressed below in the first part of this essay.  Only once a sustainable
conception of gender has been elaborated do I turn to the question of methodological issues
surrounding its study. 
What are the problems that arise in the study of gender? First of all it is not clear what
sort of thing the category signifies.  Within modern feminist thought the standard definition of
gender is something like “the social meaning given to biological differences between the
sexes” (Ferber and Nelson, 1993, pp 9-10; Kuiper and Sap, 1995, pp. 2-3)1. Though widely
accepted, a problem with the formulation is that it allows of various interpretations (for exam-
ple, gender as a subjective experience, a psychological orientation, a set of attributes pos-
sessed, a normative image or ideal, and so forth), whilst a satisfactory elaboration has proven
elusive.
Further, whatever the precise interpretation of the category, and despite the significant
use made of the sex/gender distinction by early (second-wave) feminists, numerous theorists
now appear sceptical about its analytical usefulness.
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1 The distinction between sex and gender on which this conception builds derives from the work of the psychologist
Robert Stoller (1968) who first formulated it to differentiate the socio-cultural meanings (‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’)
from those of biological sex differences (‘male’ and ‘female’) on which they were erected (see Oakley, 1972).
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s feminists began increasingly to emphasise the partiality
of all knowledge, and to criticise the tendency of (typically white and male) scientists to pre-
sume their views to be uninfluenced by local biases, personal histories and values. The domi-
nant message of these feminists was that a fuller vision of reality could be uncovered by draw-
ing attention to gendered locations, that a theorising of gender was a useful way of uncovering
previously hidden aspects of the social process (see, for example, Chodorow, 1978 and Keller,
1985). These gender theorists argued that concepts commonly used to evaluate behaviour
(such as calculative rationality in economics) do not express universal values or ideals but
male ones.
Although insightful, by the late 1980s this early feminist contribution was being chal-
lenged by other feminists for making the same sorts of (‘essentialist’) mistakes that it itself
criticised.  Specifically, the earlier (typically white, middle class) feminists were charged with
treating their own particular experience of gender differences as universal; they were criticised
for taking “the experience of white middle-class women to be representative of, indeed nor-
mative for, the experience of all women” (Spelman, 1990, p.Ⅸ).  In so doing, these early fem-
inists were accused of  marginalising differences of race, ethnocentricity, culture, age and so
forth; women of colour, lesbians and others found their history and culture ignored in the
ongoing discussions relating to gender.
As a result of this criticism there emerged an epistemological position often referred to
as gender scepticism, characterised precisely by its “scepticism about the use of gender as an
analytic category” (Bordo, 1993, p. 135).  Gender sceptics argue that an individual’s gender
experience is so affected by that individual’s class, race or cultural, etc., experience that it is
meaningless to consider gender at all as a useful category.  For once we are attentive to differ-
ences of class, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, and so on, the notion of gender disintegrates
into fragments unusable for systematic theory. According to this assessment it is impossible to
separate facts about gender from those about race, class, ethnic origin, and so on. Spelman
writes:
“If it were possible to isolate a woman’s “womanness” from her racial identity, then we
should have no trouble imagining that had I been Black I could have had just the same
understanding of myself as a woman as I in fact do….It is thus evident that thinking
about a person’s identity as made up of neatly distinguishable “parts” may be very mis-
leading” (Spelman, 1990, pp 135-6).
In short, early feminist (and other) gender theorists were criticised for assuming cross-cultural
stability of facts about gender, and a separability of the parts of a person’s achieved identity.
If the intent of this criticism was to be corrective, it was soon to be pushed to destructive
extremes.  Specifically, some postmodernists came to argue that, because of differences of
ethnic origin, sexual orientation, culture and so forth, not only is each individual’s experience
unique but no category can legitimately be treated as stable or separable. The fact of differen-
tial historical experiences means that each ‘woman’ differs from every other and it is impossi-
ble or meaningless to talk of the ‘authentic woman’ and so to unify different individuals under
the signifier ‘woman’. There is no woman’s (or of course man’s) experience, situation or point
of view. As a result, it is difficult to make sense of feminist projects of collective emancipa-
tion. For who is to be emancipated, and from whom? The sort of perspective in question leads
to a view of a world of only difference, an individualist perspective in which it is impossible to
make much sense of any system or collectivity, whether oppressive or otherwise.
Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender
2
21-01-Tony Lawson  07.4.12  11:21  ページ2
This ‘postmodernist’ critique of (interpretations of) early gender theorising contains
much insight and can indeed be read in part as a corrective of the excesses or errors of naive
essentialist positions.  However, the critique itself is ultimately not satisfactory in that it loses
the central insight of the earlier feminist contribution entirely. For according to the logic of the
postmodernist critique there is no basis for systematic forces of societal discrimination2. Yet it
cannot really be denied that there are systematic forms of domination in society as we experi-
ence it, and in particular that biological females are very often dominated or oppressed by
males, and in ways that have little if anything to do with sexual as opposed to social differ-
ences. (And this is indeed manifest in the orientations, language, values and priorities of acad-
emic disciplines, as economics illustrates as well as anything else (refs).)
Put differently, the postmodernist critique, in highlighting the problems of essentialism,
loses the insight for which gender analysis was originally formulated, namely the discrimina-
tion of individuals classified as ‘women’ in ways that have little directly to do with the quality
of being female3. If it is widely recognised that there are many types of differences between
members of society, specifically between those classified as men and women, we need to
attend to ways of disentangling rather than neglecting the types that there are. As Anne
Phillips has observed:
“Notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties feminists have raised around the distinction
between sex and gender, we will continue to need some way of disentangling the differ-
ences that are inevitable from those that are chosen, and from those that are imposed”
(Phillips 1992, p. 23).
What is needed, it seems, is a conception of gender that can sustain both 1) the insights under-
pinning the noted criticisms of early gender theorising, specifically the fragmented experi-
ences of us all and the difficulties of partialling out the gendered aspects of our experiences,
as well as 2) the (widely recognised) feature of our world that gender is an objective category
that (currently) marks the site of the domination of one (gendered) group by another.
We need a conception that can sustain the insight that we all are different, that our expe-
riences and identities are historically, culturally and socially etc., variable and indeed unique,
as well as the deep intuition that there is a need for, and legitimacy to, collective organisation
and struggle.
We need, in short, a conception that transcends the opposition of difference and unity
with a clear basis for achieving both, a conception precisely of unity in difference. I now want
to indicate how ontological elaboration can facilitate a conception of the sort required.
Tony Lawson
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2 As Kate Soper complains:
“...the logic which challenged certain kinds of identity thinking and deconstructed certain notions of truth, progress,
humanism and the like, has pushed on to question the possibility of any holistic and objective analysis of societies of a
kind which allows to define them as ‘capitalist' or ‘patriarchal' or indeed totalitarian, together with the transformative
projects such analyses advocate.  It gives us not new identities, not a better understanding of the plural and complex
nature of society, but tends rather to collapse into an out and out individualism" (Soper, 1991, p. 45).
3 As Susan Bordo summarises the situation:
“Assessing where we are now, it seems to me that feminism stands less in danger of the totalizing tendencies of femi-
nists than of an increasingly paralysing anxiety over falling (from what grace?) into ethnocentrism or
‘essentialism.’...Do we want to delegitimate a priori the exploration of experimental continuity and structural common
ground among women?......If we wish to empower diverse voices, we would do better, I believe, to shift strategy from
the methodological dictum that we foreswear talk of ‘male’ and ‘female’ realities...to the messier, more slippery, practi-
cal struggle to create institutions and communities that will not permit some groups of people to make determinations
about reality for all” (Bordo, 1993, p. 465).
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Ontology 
By social ontology, let me recall, I mean the study (or a theory) of the basic nature and struc-
ture of social being. And by the social, I just mean that domain of phenomena whose exis-
tence, at least in part, depends on us. Thus it includes artefacts, technology, wars, pollutions,
social relations, institutions, and so forth. 
Now a first fundamental feature of the social realm, one of significance to the issues
being addressed here, is that it is structured in the sense of comprising more than one ontolog-
ical level.  Specifically, it consists in far more than actualities such as (actual) human behav-
iour including its observable patterns.  It also comprises features such as social rules, rela-
tions, positions, processes, systems, values, meaning and the like, that do not reduce to human
behaviour.  Nor do features such as these exist just in their instantiation or manifestation in
behaviour.  Rather they are mostly ontologically distinct from behaviour. Such features that do
not reduce to behaviour can be termed social structures, constituting, in their entirety, social
structure.
How do I defend the claim that social reality includes structure that is ontologically irre-
ducible to human agency or behaviour? I go into this at length elsewhere (e.g. Lawson 1997,
2003).  Basically the argument is that a conception of social reality as structured is required if
we are to render intelligible numerous widespread features of everyday life.
Most clearly the distinction is required to make sense of the widespread observation of a
gap between cultural norms or stipulations and patterns of individual behaviour. More precise-
ly, the distinction is necessitated if we are to render intelligible practices in which rules affect
action, but are systematically contravened in it.  For example, workers in conflict with their
employers or management could not threaten to ‘work-to rule’, as they do in the UK, if any
rule (or set of rules) in question just reduces to the norm or average form of the work activities
that are already being undertaken.  Nor could the workforce sensibly make such ‘threats’ if
they did not have the power or agency to do so, a power that is not reducible to what in the
event happens (whatever the outcome)
Also in the UK, not all, but some, motorway drivers regularly exceed the recognised
speed limit. In some cities of the world (for example Naples) most drivers pass some (but
rarely all) red lights, and so on.  In short, rules and the practices upon which they bear, are
sometimes aligned but at other times are systematically out of phase. This is a feature of reali-
ty we can render intelligible only by recognising that social structures and the practices they
condition, though presupposing of each other, are irreducible each to the other. For it is only
because they are ontologically distinct and irreducible that they can be aligned on occasion, or
that any ‘threat’ (promise or request) to align them makes sense.  
Human beings too are structured. Individual agents have capacities and dispositions, for
example, which are irreducible to the behaviour patterns we produce.  Each of us has capaci-
ties that may never be exercised.  And, individually, we are continually reflexive, even having
both conversations with ourselves as well as other first person experiences that are not open to
inspection by others. These clearly have their conditions of possibility, presumably including
processes in the brain. But the subjective aspects appear irreducible to any neurobiological
activity.  Most clearly what we can do does not reduce to the patterns of behaviour that others
can observe; and nor even does all of what we actually do4.
So the social realm consists, in part, of social structures and human subjects that are
reducible neither to each other nor to human practices. It may already be clear how I am going
to argue that the category gender can be retained as a meaningful object of reality with a
Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender
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degree of stability. For I will argue that gender is in large part a feature of social structure, i.e.,
something that is irreducible to human practices or experiences. First though let me say some-
thing more about the forms of social structure as well as its (processual) mode of being.
Social positions and relations
In emphasizing the structured nature of social life I have so far focused upon social rules. But
this is not all there is to social being.  For society is also constituted in a fundamental way by
both social relations and positions. These features are essential to understanding the precise
manner in which human agency and structure come together.
The significance and fact of social relations and positions are easily recognised once we
take note (and inquire into the conditions) of that general feature of experience that there is a
systematic disparity across individuals regarding the practices that are, and apparently can be,
followed. Although most rules can be utilized by a wide group of people it by no means fol-
lows that all rules are available, or apply equally, to everyone, even within a given culture. To
the contrary, any (segment of) society is highly segmented in terms of the obligations and pre-
rogatives that are on offer. Teachers, for example, are allowed and expected to follow different
practices to students, government ministers to follow different ones to lay-people, employers
to employees, landlords to tenants, and so on. Rules as resources are not equally available, or
do not apply equally, to each member of the population at large.
What then explains the differentiated ascription of obligations, prerogatives, privileges
and responsibilities?  This question directs attention to the wider one of how human beings
and social structure such as rules come together in the first place. If social structure such as
rules are a different sort of thing to human beings, human agency and even action, what is the
point of contact between human agency and structure?  How do they inter-connect?  In partic-
ular how do they come together in such a manner that different individuals achieve responsi-
bilities and obligations available to some but not all others, and thereby call on, or come to be
conditioned in their actions by, different social rules and so structures of power?
If it is clearly the case that teachers have different responsibilities, obligations and pre-
rogatives to students, and government ministers face different ones to the rest of us, then it is
equally apparent that these obligations and prerogatives exist independently of the particular
individuals who happen, currently, to be teachers, students or ministers. If I, as a university
teacher, were to move on tomorrow, someone-else would take over my teaching responsibili-
ties and enjoy the same obligations and prerogatives as I currently do. Indeed, those who occu-
py the positions of students are different every year. In short, society is constituted in large
Tony Lawson
4 It is clear that this irreducibility of social structure and human subjectivity can be rendered intelligible only if we
recognise the reality of processes of emergence, underpinning emergent social and psychological realms in particular (see
e.g. Lawson 1997, especially chapters 6 and 13, 2003).  Let me briefly elaborate.
A strata of reality can be said to be emergent, or as possessing emergent powers, if there is a sense in which it i) has
arisen out of a lower strata, being formed by principles operative at the lower level; ii) remains dependent on the lower stra-
ta for its existence; but iii) contains causal powers of its own which are both irreducible to those operating at the lower level
and (perhaps) capable of acting back on the lower level.  Thus organic material emerged from inorganic material.  And,
according to the conception I am defending, the social realm is emergent from human (inter-) action, though with properties
irreducible to, yet capable of causally affecting, the latter. 
So interpreted the theory of emergence commits us to a form of materialism which ultimately entails the unilateral
ontological dependence of social upon biological upon physical forms coupled with the taxonomic and causal irreducibility
of each to any other.  Thus, although, for example, the geo-historical emergence of organic from inorganic matter and of
human beings from hominids can be acknowledged, when we come to explain those physical and biological states which
are due, in part, to intentional human agency it is necessary to reference properties, including powers, not designated by
physical or biological science (again see Lawson, 1997).
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part by a set of positions, each associated with numerous obligations, rights and duties, and
into which agents, as it were, slot.
Internal relations
Something more about this system of societal positions can be expressed if we take note of the
additional observation that practices routinely followed by an occupant of any position tend to
be orientated towards some other group(s). The rights, tasks and obligations of teachers, for
example, are orientated towards their interactions with students (and vice-versa), towards
research funding bodies or governing institutions, and so forth. Similarly the rights and oblig-
ations of landladies/lords are orientated towards their interactions with tenants, and so on.
Such considerations clearly indicate a causal role for certain forms of relation. Two types
of relation can be distinguished: external and internal. Two objects or aspects are externally
related if neither is constituted by the relationship in which it stands to the other. Bread and
butter, coffee and milk, barking dog and mail carrier, two passing strangers, provide examples.
In contrast, two objects are internally related if they are what they are by virtue of the relation-
ship in which they stand to one other. Landlady/lord and tenant, employer and employee,
teacher and student, magnet and its field are examples that spring easily to mind. In each case
it is not possible to have the one without the other; each, in part, is what it is, and does what it
does, by virtue of the relation in which it stands to the other.
Now the intelligibility of rule-governed and the rule-differentiated social situation noted
above requires that we recognise first the internal relationality of social life, and second that
the internal relationality in question is primarily not of individuals per se but of social posi-
tions; it is the positions (say of teachers and students) that are relationally defined.
The picture that emerges, then, is of a set, or network, of positions characterised by the
rules and so practices associated with them, where the latter are determined in relation to
other positions and their associated rules and practices. On this conception the basic building
blocks of society are positions, involving, depending upon, or constituted according to, social
rules and associated tasks, obligations, and prerogatives, along with the practices they govern,
where such positions are both defined in relation to other positions and are immediately occu-
pied by individuals.
Systems and Collectivities
Notice further that notions of social systems or collectivities can be straightforwardly devel-
oped using the conceptions of social structure as rules, practices, relationships and positions
now elaborated. Most generally, social systems and collectivities can be viewed as ensembles
of networked, internally-related, positions with their associated rules and practices. All the
familiar social systems, collectivities and organizations –– the economy, the state, international
and national companies, trade unions, households, schools and hospitals –– can be recognised
as depending upon, presupposing, or consisting in, internally-related position-rule systems of
this form.
Sub-distinctions can be drawn.  If a social system is best conceived as a structured
process of interaction, a social group or collectivity can be understood as consisting in, or
depending upon, or as a set of people distinguishable by, their current occupancy of a specific
set of social positions.  Notice that at any one time a particular individual will occupy any
number of positions.  That is the same person, who may be a parent or a child, a worker or a
Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender
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boss, teacher or a student, immigrant or native, old or young, member of religious or political
or community organisations and so on.  The resulting conception then is one that 1) renders
intelligible the often noted, but reputedly difficult to sustain, sense of a group or collective
interest and thus the basis for a theory of collective action, and yet 2) allows the possibility of
a conflict of interest at the level of individuals.
Put differently, on this relational conception any specific collectivity can be understood
in terms both of its relations to other groups, especially those against which it is defined
and/or is opposed, as well as of the complex of internal relationships within the collectivity
itself.  Amongst the many advantages of this conception is the feature that, in stark contrast to
mainstream economics, it allows a meaningful focus not only upon production and exchange
activities but also upon a range of distributional issues as well, such as resources to groups as
well as people to positions (or positions to people).
Descending now from ontology to substantive theory, my contention is that gender be
defined in terms of the nexus of internally related positions to which biological females and
males are assigned in any context (or which are assigned to individuals identified as biological
females or males), along with the associated rules, rights and obligations and so forth. This
enables us to locate the site of domination (and recognise that feminist distributional studies
ought indeed to be concerned with the allocation of positions) whilst allowing that every indi-
vidual’s path is unique, just as her or his occupancy of positions variable and complex and
again unique. This conception thus allows uniqueness at the level of the actual, including
experience, the focus of postmodernists, whilst maintaining the ability to locate the forces of
discrimination so many regularly experience. 
Social Being as Process 
Now if the above account is to prove sustainable, it clearly follows that the societal positions
that individuals occupy and the rules associated with them be (or can be) relatively enduring.
Yet the whole question of the fixity or otherwise of social structure, as well as of the human
individual, is a topic that has yet to be broached.  These are issues that must be addressed.
It is instructive at this point to consider the mode of being of social structure.  To focus
the discussion, consider a system of language. Clearly we are all born into language systems;
none of us create them.  At the same time, being social phenomena, langauge systems depend
on us, and specifically on transformative human agency. So they do not determine what we
do, they do not create our speech acts; they merely facilitate them. So in theorising the rela-
tionship of agency and structure here, the categories of creation and determinism are out of
place here.  Rather we must view matters in terms of the categories of transformation and
reproduction.  For any given language system, its structure of rules, etc., is given to the indi-
vidual when he or she comes to speak, and it is reproduced and/or transformed through the
sum total of individuals engaging in speech acts.  The social structure in question, then, is the
(typically unacknowledged) condition of a set of practices, just as its reproduction and/or
transformation is the (typically unintended) result of these practices.
Now what is true of the mode of being of a language system holds for all social struc-
ture; social structures exist as processes of reproduction and transformation.  A market or a
university or a language system does not exist in a primarily static form, subject at most to
moments of change (due to new technology or whatever).  Rather change is essential to the
mode of being of such structures; they exist as continuous processes of transformation and/or
reproduction. Even where aspects of certain social structures appear a posteriori to remain
Tony Lawson
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intact, this is only and always because they have been actively (if mostly unintentionally)
reproduced. On this conception, which has elsewhere in economics been systematised as the
transformational model of social activity, no aspects are fixed and out of time.  All are subject
to processes of transformation.  So there is no ontological prioritisation of continuity over
change (or vice versa); continuity and change are ontologically equivalent.  And each, when it
occurs, is open to, and for understanding necessitates, (a causal) explanation (see e.g., Lawson
1997, 2003).
Social structure, then, is reproduced and transformed through human practice. But the
same can be said of (the embodied personality of) each individual.  For, as we have seen, the
human individual too is structured.  To speak a language such as English presupposes the
capacity to do so.  To possess the capacity to speak English presupposes the more basic capac-
ity for language acquisition, and so on. Human individuals are far more than their behaviours.
And the ways in which capacities and dispositions are developed and maintained or trans-
formed, depends on individual practices.  The same applies, of course, to tastes, or prefer-
ences, long term and short term plans, other features of individual identity, psychological
make-up, and so forth. So the individual agent, just like social structure, is continually repro-
duced and transformed through practice.
The social world, including both structure and human agency, then, turns on human
practice.  Social structure and human agency are each conditions of the other, although neither
can be reduced to the other, nor to the practices through which both are reproduced and/or
transformed5.
The forgoing is a brief overview of aspects of the realist transformational model of
social activity.  It is a model that is seen to be appropriate once social reality is conceptualised
as being structured.  And a conception of social reality as structured is found to be a require-
ment of explaining familiar aspects of every day experience.  The overall transformational
conception is a thoroughly non-reductionist account of linked or co-development.  Neither
structure nor agency has analytical priority, for each depends irreducibly on the other. And
although each develops at its own ontological level, it does so only in conditions set by the
other.  Thus each is significantly dependent on, though not created or determined by, the other.
Social life, then, is intrinsically dynamic, and interdependent.
Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender
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5 One further component of this transformational conception is that there are both synchronic and diachronic aspects
to agency-structure interaction.  It is, of course, human beings that make things happen.  And it is only through the media-
tion of human agency that structures have a causal impact.  Now if a person who speaks only English makes a short (possi-
bly unplanned) visit to a region where English is not spoken, the inability to speak the local language (or the existence only
of languages other than English) will be experienced by the traveller as a constraint. It forces her or him to seek a translator
or whatever.  If, however, English is spoken as a second language, this will be experienced by the traveller as an enabling
(as well as constraining) feature of the local social structure.  Here, with the momentarily enabling and/or constraining
aspects of social structure we have the synchronic aspect of agency-structure interaction.
However, if the individual who speaks only English decides to settle in a non-English speaking region, then, if she or
he is to become competent it will be necessary to acquire the local language (and indeed become competent in numerous
aspects of the local culture).  The process through which this happens is the diachronic aspect of agency-structure interac-
tion.  If at a point in time structure serves to constrain and enable, overtime it serves more to shape and mould.  As new
practices are repeatedly carried out they become habitual as dispositions are moulded in response. This, of course, cannot
happen without the collusion of the individual in question (and the mediation of her or his practices).  If the individual
remains for a long time in the new language or culture zone, she or he may even loose the capacity to speak English, or at
least to do so competently.  Just as human capabilities, etc., can be transformed via the relocation, so the maintenance of
those previously held may require active reproduction.  Experience suggests that individuals can lose a significant degree of
competence in languages with which they once were fluent (also, of course, what is true of capabilities and dispositions
applies equally to tastes, preferences, and the like).
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Gender
So how does all this help with theorising the category of gender?  It does so through providing
a framework that can sustain the notion of gender in a manner that evades the charges levelled
by gender sceptics and others whilst retaining the ability to explain domination and discrimi-
nation.  As we shall further see in due course (in a final section) the framework also encour-
ages an optimistic outlook in that it sustains the possibility both of progress in social under-
standing. Let me elaborate my contentions in a more detailed way.   
Turning once more from ontology to social theory the most compelling way of under-
standing gender (if the perspective defended above is correct) is, as I have already briefly indi-
cated, as a nexus of internally related positions with their associated rights, obligations, pre-
rogatives, duties, perks and practices. Gender categories, in other words, are conceived in
terms of how individuals are socially positioned.  Gender categories tend to be hierarchically
structured within the broad network of social relations.
The point to the distinction between sex and gender is that males and females differ not
only physically but also (in most if not all societies so far) in their social positions. On this
conception, sexual difference is widely employed as a marker to distinguish two (or more)
groups, and is used as a basis for these groups to be treated unequally in their allocation of
hierarchically structured positions.  Specifically, albeit in ways that vary from culture to cul-
ture, region to region and over time, societies typically privilege individuals with male bodies,
and do so in terms of shaping the positions (with their associated rights, obligations and pre-
rogatives, etc) in which males and females stand. Individuals with female bodies are typically
allocated positions bearing more subservient roles and duties.
Now an individual’s experiences will of course vary according to social positions entered
and retained and others previously exited. And identities achieved will, to a significant extent,
depend on a person’s (always fallible) experiences. On this conception a woman (man) is per-
haps best thought of as an individual who predominantly occupies and has occupied positions
designated as those of women (or men)6. 
However, if the continually reproduced and transformed social structure, comprising a
network of internally related positions and associated rights and obligations, provides the site,
the objective basis, for forms of gender and other discrimination, and if women (men) are
individuals who have been mostly allocated positions designated those of women (men), it
warrants emphasis that there is no one-to-one mapping from social structure to individual
pathways, experience or personal identities.
Each person occupies many positions simultaneously, and life is a unique path of enter-
ing and exiting. So the perspective sustained is quite consistent with the postmodernist insight
of multiple or fragmented experiences.  Experiences anyway are mediated theoretically.  We
can get things wrong, and we each regularly find we experience a given situation differently
from others; we can also come to reinterpret our experiences over time. Further, identities,
which vary from person to person, are something of an additional theoretical construction,
based on, amongst other things, fallible knowledge of situations, possibilities, normative
ideals, plans and constraints.  As such they are open to evaluation. Indeed in that we continu-
ally reproduce and transform our identities they are something of an (ongoing) achievement.
Tony Lawson
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ly do adopt, and have adopted, positions associated with women (men) we ought to allow that one can be a woman (man)
without having a female (male) body.
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So, to repeat, there is no strict correspondence between the structures experienced and
identities formed. However, if the reduction of identities to conditions experienced is a theo-
retical error, and if each person’s experiences are unique, it remains the case that the condi-
tions we experience do nevertheless make a difference. And if we ultimately make our own
identities, we do so only with the resources available, and in conditions not all of our own
choosing.  In particular the nature of gender positions we occupy or have occupied, along with
all other features of our specific social situations, many of which have been allocated to us,
causally impinge on our experiences and so constitute conditioning factors of our identities7.
In sum, the conception defended here retains the insights of both the early gender theo-
rists as well as their postmodernist critics. It retains the latter’s emphasis on multiple or frag-
mented experiences, whilst also sustaining the wider feminist insight that our societies provide
an objective basis for the discriminating tendencies already noted.
The central contention underpinning my arguments is that there is an ontological distinc-
tion between social structure and human agency, whereby neither can be reduced to the other,
though each is continually transformed through a process of linked or co-development.
In the light of the perspective defended we find that gender sceptics portray early (sup-
posedly essentialist) feminists as in effect, reducing agency to specific (gender) structures, or
at least to specific aspects regarded as fixed, whilst gender sceptics themselves have respond-
ed by cutting the individual free of structural forces of determination entirely.  However we
can now recognise both the initial (essentialist) form of gender theorising as well the out and
out deconstructive response, as polar degenerate cases of the range of real possibilities, with
the deconstructive response in particular achieving its credibility only by situating essential-
ism as the only alternative. But, as I say, there are additional possibilities.  And once the con-
ception elaborated above is accepted we have a basis for sustaining the insights of both essen-
tialist and postmodernist perspectives, whilst avoiding the limit weaknesses of each.
Implications for theory and practice
I am now in a position to consider some methodological issues that are pertinent to the study
of gender? 
In the context of modern economics, the discipline with which I am most familiar, per-
haps the most critical insight is that the mainstream tradition is methodologically not equipped
for the study of gender at all. Let me quickly indicate why.
Modern economics is dominated by a mainstream tradition defined by its insistence on
using methods of mathematical-deductive modelling. This much is increasingly recognised.  It
is less often noticed, however, that such methods (like all methods) have ontological presuppo-
sitions.
Now the presupposition of the universal reliance on these mathematical-deductive meth-
ods is a world of isolated atoms.  By atoms I do not mean something small, but rather some-
thing that, if triggered, exercises its separate, independent and invariable effects.   The point is
that the methods in question require regularities of the form “whenever event x then event y”
if they are to gain practical purchase.  And in order to guarantee that in identical conditions x
then y always follows, the individuals of the analysis must be atomistic and isolated in the
Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender
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7 Although the conception here is derived by way of first elaborating the ontological conception discussed above and
defended more fully elsewhere, others have reached a similar position on certain aspects via alternative routes.  See for
example,  Mohanty (2000) and Moya (2000).
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manner described (the image is of a toy doll that, once wound up, will, if placed on a given
spot, repeatedly walk forward in the same way on each occasion, just so long as nothing inter-
feres with it). 
Already then we can see that mainstream economics does not look promising as a basis
for expressing meaningful or realistic conceptions of gender (or much else). Mostly modern
economic analyses have taken the assumption that human beings are everywhere the same.
For those concerned to make something of gender differences, the working presumption has
merely been that men and women are worth distinguishing if this somehow makes a statistical
difference to the analysis. Thus econometric equations have typically had a “dummy variable”
inserted into them, taking the value 0 for a male, and 1 for a female.  If the estimated coeffi-
cient on this variable is “found” to be (in a statistical sense) significantly greater than zero,
then this is interpreted as capturing the effect of gender, and in particular the return to, or the
effect of, the character of being female rather than (the standard) male. By construction this
effect is assumed constant throughout the population, at least over time period and/or cross-
section studied.
Of course, economists, especially mainstream ones, are typically not very reflective
about these matters.  And if this implicit position can be described as a (very) naive form of
essentialism, this would be news to most economists, as would be the implication that they are
taking sides in a philosophical debate.
As we have seen, however, social reality is in fact an open-ended, evolving holistic sys-
tem, a far cry, in fact, from scenarios of the atomistic and closed sort that would licence a
reliance on the modelling practices of modern economics.  But do we not here confront an
insurmountable obstacle to explanatory social theory? For if social reality is really of the sort
described how can we identify unknown causal aspects of it?  Indeed some economists do
argue precisely that we should treat the social world as closed (in the manner required by their
methods of mathematical modelling) even though it is suspected of being otherwise, merely to
be able to say anything about it.
To appreciate the force of this concern, it is instructive to consider the site of most of the
occurring event regularities of the sort that mainstream economists treat as ubiquitous.  The
insight here is that such stable correlations as occur are not only mostly confined to the natur-
al realm but are restricted to situations of experimental control. For example, a table tennis
ball will fall with a constant rate of acceleration when dropped in a (typically laboratory pro-
duced) vacuum, but rarely does so outside the experimental set up.
Why is this? It is simply because outside the experimental laboratory any object that is
‘dropped’ tends, in its movement, to be influenced by a range of causal factors.  The wind,
thermal forces, table-tennis bats and much else may affect the movement of the ball.  That is
the point of an experimental set up; the aim is to isolate a stable causal mechanism from the
influence of countervailing mechanisms in order to better identify its properties.
Now where an event regularity is achieved in conditions of experimental control, the
events correlated are the triggering of a mechanism and its effects.  But the real focus of
experimental research is an understanding of the isolated mechanism itself.  For unlike the
(experimentally produced) event regularity the mechanism responsible may operate inside and
outside the experimental set-up alike.  Thus the gravitational tendency or mechanism operates
on leaves and table tennis balls even as they fly over roofs and chimneys.  And knowledge of it
helps build bridges and send rockets to the moon.
Now if we turn to the social realm it is difficult, or often even meaningless to seek, to
isolate some bits of society from others; the social realm seems intrinsically open.  Firms,
Tony Lawson
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money, markets, institutions and the like cannot be experimentally isolated from each other.
Indeed we have seen that most, if not all, social phenomena are, like gender, constituted in
their relations to something else. Once more we cannot have employers without employees,
teachers without students, parents without children, and so on; whenever any of us move into
new positions, as students, employees, trade union members, etc., what we can and cannot do
is determined by our relations to others.
Notice that this does not mean that social science cannot be as illuminating as natural
science.  As we saw in the discussion of well-controlled experiment, the aim of the latter is not
the production of an event regularity per se, but the empirical identification of a mechanism
(though isolating it from other potentially countervailing causal factors).  That is, the aim of
this aspect of natural science is to uncover the causal mechanisms (like gravity) that govern
the phenomena we can (or may be able to) directly experience (such as movements in table
tennis balls and autumn leaves). And there is no reason to suppose that the experimental pro-
duction of an event regularity is crucial for this, however useful the well-controlled experi-
ment may be in conditions where it is possible.  I now want to indicate that alternative non-
experimental ways of proceeding are perfectly feasible and common, and available to social
explanatory endeavour too. 
Contrast Explanation
I have run through the above because some commentators, noting the limited possibilities for
controlled experimental work in the social realm, have reasoned that if any social phenome-
non is really governed by many causal factors, where we cannot experimentally isolate the
effects of any one of them, the only option available is to pretend that social phenomena can
be treated as if generated under conditions of the controlled experiment.
The point I want to make is that we often can isolate the effects of a single causal mech-
anism in such an open system. The controlled experiment is but a special case of a method I
want to describe here. This is the method of contrast explanation. All we need for this method
to work are i) two outcomes that are different in a situation wherein ii) we had reason to
expect them to be the same, stemming from our understanding of them as sharing the same, or
a sufficiently similar causal history.
Consider the onset of mad cows disease. In the late 1980s in the UK, a group of cows
surprised everyone and confounded expectations by revealing unfortunate symptoms.  Cows
are holistic animals, and many factors influence their behaviour.  However, by comparing the
conditions of the affected cows with others that revealed no symptoms, it was possible to stan-
dardise for the causes common to both groups, creating a situation in which it was possible in
effect to isolate and identify the cause of the difference, i.e., of the phenomenon of interest.
More generally in contrast explanation we seek to explain not some X, but why some `X
rather than Y’, in a situation where Y was expected (given our understanding of the causal his-
tory of the relevant phenomenon). In such a situation we do not seek all the causes of X but
the one that made it different from the Y that was anticipated.
Controlled experiments constitute a special case of contrast explanation. In outdoor
research, such as in plant breeding experiments, a field may be divided into numerous plots
with, say, some chemical, or whatever, applied to some plots only.  If the average yield is high-
er in the plots where the chemical is applied we can conclude that the chemical acts as a fertil-
izer, that it explains not the level of yield but the yield differential.  
In the outdoor experiment, the conditions in the field can vary throughout the growing
Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender
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season.  The method works just because at any point in time the effects are the same through-
out the field, except for the chemical whose properties are under investigation.
The indoor laboratory experiment is different only in that the background conditions are
held constant throughout the period of the experiment, allowing a meaningful contrast
between what happens prior to, and what occurs with, a mechanism being triggered.
But these experimental scenarios, though useful in science, are not necessary for
explanatory endeavour.  All we need is an informed perspective giving us reason to believe
two outcomes will be the same in a situation where they are found to be different. In that situ-
ation there is prima facie reason to suppose a single causal factor is responsible, and reason to
expect it can be identified (for a longer more detailed discussion, see Lawson, 2003, chapter
4).
Of course, in the context of gender study specifically, a contrast between what happens
and our expectations may well be a frequent occurrence, especially if, as postmodernists
believe, outcomes are highly variable.  Contrasts between opportunities available to differently
gendered individuals, or in the opportunities available to individuals according to their gen-
dered situations will be especially apparent. 
Contrast Explanation and Feminist Standpoint theory
Now it is perhaps not surprising that contrast explanation, a method singularly appropriate for
investigating open systems, including those comprising highly internally related and dynamic
ones, links easily with feminist standpoint theory, an approach also fashioned to deal with
complex social relations in process. Let briefly indicate how. 
First of all both approaches not only recognise the situated nature of the researcher, but
interpret this situatedness or standpoint not as a constraint but a resource.  Both treat interest-
ed standpoints (including acquired values and prejudices, etc.) are not only unavoidable but
actually indispensable aids to the explanatory process8. The task of detecting and identifying
previously unknown causal mechanisms seems to require the forming of surprising or interest-
ing contrasts, and the latter in turn presupposes people in positions of being able to detect or
form relevant contrasts and to perceive them as surprising or otherwise of interest and to want
to act on their surprise or aroused interest. The initiation of new lines of investigation requires
people predisposed, literally prejudiced, to looking in certain directions.
It follows that science, or the knowledge process more generally, can benefit if undertak-
en by individuals who are predisposed in different ways, who are situated differently. It is thus
the case, as other feminists have already argued (for example, Seiz, 1995; Harding, 1995;
Longino, 1990), that the endeavour to attract diverse voices into the scientific community or
any prominent (or other) discussion can be supported on grounds not just of democracy or
fairness but also of good methodological practice.
Second contrastive explanation theory appears capable of reinforcing the insight that
marginalised positions can facilitate significant insights. Let us recall the claim of standpoint
theorists that certain positioned ways of knowing are in some sense or manner privileged. In
early feminist formulations the emphasis was upon ways of knowing of women. In more
recent accounts, the viewpoint of any group that has been marginalised is regarded as privi-
leged. My contention here, is that such claims of standpoint theory can be given a good deal
Tony Lawson
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situated knowledges” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581).
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of backing if we see the relative advantage of the marginalised arising (in part or whole) just
in their being better able to recognise contrasts of some significance.
How might being marginalised, meaning being constrained from the centre of some form
of life, confer a relative epistemic advantage?  More specifically why do I suppose it can facil-
itate the detection of contrasts that are (in a manner yet to be explicated) highly significant?
The answer lies in that dual feature of being marginal that it denotes both an insider and out-
sider position. To be marginalised you are outside of the centre. But equally in order to be
marginalised you first have to belong. UK women usually are, but the Hopi indians are not,
marginalised in modern UK society. Feminist economists, post Keynesians, (old) institutional-
ists, Austrians and Marxian economists are, but physicists and chemists are not, marginalised
in modern university economics departments.
It is this duality of belonging and yet being constrained from the centre, I think, that is
essential to the epistemically advantaged situation of the marginalised. It facilitates an aware-
ness of contrasts of significance. For unlike the dominant group, the marginalised are forced
both to be aware of the practices, belief systems, values and traditions, etc., of the dominant
group as well to live their own. And with this being the case there is a greater opportunity at
least, for marginalised people to beware of contrasts between the two, contrasts that can lead
ultimately to the understanding of both sets of community structures, and the relevance of the
two, and their inter-relatedness (and so ultimately the functioning of the totality). It is in this
way and sense in particular, that contrasts more readily available to the marginalised are likely
to be especially significant in a given context9.
So the (or anyway one significant) advantage that one position may have over another is
that it can facilitate different contrasts being noted and so lines of enquiry being pursued. In
any investigation of a noted contrastive phenomenon, numerous hypothesized explanations
may be entertained, and the ease or difficulty with which a relevant causal mechanism is iden-
tified will depend, amongst other things, on both the context as well as the skills of the inves-
tigators involved. So the systematic advantage of the marginalised standpoint lies not in the
truth status of the answers obtained, but in the nature of the questions that are recognised as
significant and so substance of the answers arrived at.
Here my understanding seems to cohere with standpoint theorists themselves who, like
Sandra Harding for example, put the emphasis on the achieving of alternative lines of enquiry:
“...the activities of those at the bottom of such social hierarchies can provide starting
points for thought -- for everyone’s research and scholarship -- from which humans’ rela-
tions with each other and the natural world can become visible. This is because the expe-
rience and lives of marginalized peoples, as they understand them, provide particularly
significant problems to be explained or research agendas” (Harding, 1993, p. 240;
emphasis in the original).
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Final Comments
I have considered some methodological issues that are centrally important to the study of gen-
der. Methods carry their own ontologies. The sorts of mathematical modelling methods
employed by mainstream modellers force their users to consider worlds of isolated atoms.
However, a resolution of some of the problems involved with the conceptualisation of gender
strongly suggests that an adequate conception of social reality, one that can accommodate an
adequate notion of gender, is not of the closed atomistic sort with which mathematical-deduc-
tivist modelling methods are able to deal.  Instead methods appropriate for addressing phe-
nomena generated in open systems are required. Despite the assertion, frequently repeated in
modern economics, that there are no alternatives to methods that treat social reality as closed,
I have demonstrated that this is not so.  Of course, the appropriate ways to proceed when faced
with a specific question concerning gender (or anything else for that matter) will always be
dependent on context.  But we can be fairly sure that unless social theorists, including econo-
mists, supplement the existing array of analytical methods with those that, like contrast expla-
nation, are somewhat more dialectical in nature, the study of gender is unlikely to progress
very far or with much speed.
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